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Abstract 
 It is widely held that there are important differences between indicative conditionals 
(e.g. “If the authors are linguists, they have written a linguistics paper”) and subjunctive 
conditionals (e.g. “If the authors had been linguists, they would have written a linguistics 
paper”). A central difference is that indicatives and subjunctives convey different stances 
towards the truth of their antecedents. Indicatives (often) convey neutrality: for example, 
about whether the authors in question are linguists. Subjunctives (often) convey the falsity of 
the antecedent: for example, that the authors in question are not linguists. This paper tests 
prominent accounts of how these different stances are conveyed: whether by presupposition 
or conversational implicature. Experiment 1 tests the presupposition account by investigating 
whether the stances project – remain constant – when embedded under operators like 
negations, possibility modals, and interrogatives, a key characteristic of presuppositions. 
Experiment 2 tests the conversational-implicature account by investigating whether the 
stances can be cancelled without producing a contradiction, a key characteristic of 
implicatures. The results provide evidence that both stances – neutrality about the antecedent 
in indicatives and the falsity of the antecedent in subjunctives – are conveyed by 
conversational implicatures.  
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Consider these sentences:  
 (1) "If the authors are linguists, they have written a linguistics paper".  
 (2) "If the authors had been linguists, they would have written a linguistics paper". 
What, if anything, do they convey about the authors' profession? Sentence (1) seems to be 
silent on this issue: the authors may or may not be linguists. Sentence (2), in contrast, seems 
to convey that the authors are not linguists. This difference underlies a major distinction 
between types of conditional sentences (sentences of the form "If A, (then) C"). Sentences like 
(1) are typically known as indicative conditionals; sentences like (2), as subjunctive or 
counterfactual conditionals. Conditionals in general are essential to everyday language and 
reasoning; counterfactual conditionals, in particular, to causal and moral thinking (Byrne, 
2016). The relationship between these two types is one of the mysteries about conditionals 
(Bennett, 2003; Quelhas, Rasga et al., 2018).  
 It is widely accepted that indicatives and subjunctives convey different stances 
towards the truth or falsity of the antecedent (the “A” clause” of "If A, then C"). But it is not 
clear how. Classically, researchers have distinguished between two general ways to convey 
meaning: semantics and pragmatics. These terms have competing definitions, but a reasonable 
working definition is that semantics can be understood as literal, context-independent, non-
inferential, and truth-conditional meaning; and pragmatics can be understood as non-literal, 
context-dependent, inferential, and non-truth-conditional meaning2 (Birner, 2014).  
 
1  We would like to thank the reviewers, Eric Raidl, David Over, Ruth Byrne, and the 
audience at the Annual Conference of the German Linguistic Society (2021) for helpful 
discussion. We also thank Nico Vowinkel for his help with setting up the experiments. 
2  We adopt this as a working definition as a way of defining typical (though not 
necessary) characteristics. Of these typical characteristics of pragmatic meanings, perhaps the 
most controversial is non-truth-conditionality, since some would argue that pragmatic 





 This paper seeks to identify how conditionals’ stances towards the antecedent are 
conveyed. In doing so, it addresses an important debate in linguistics, the philosophy of 
language, and the psychology of reasoning on the status of these stances. The paper 
investigates whether the stances are conveyed by a presupposition (for presupposition 
accounts, see, e.g., Declerck & Reed, 2001; Fillenbaum, 1974; Khemlani, Byrne, & Johnson-
Laird; Levinson, 1981) or a conversational implicature (for conversational implicature 
accounts, see, e.g., Iatridou, 2000; Ippolito, 2003; Leahy, 2011, 2018; Mittwoch, Huddleston 
e al., 2002). We will explain these phenomena fully in the introductions to Experiments 1 and 
2 respectively. Here it suffices to note that, if the stances were conveyed by a presupposition, 
a good case could be made for these stances being part of the conventional, semantic meaning 
of the conditionals. But if the stances were conveyed by a conversational implicature, the 
stances would clearly be a pragmatic phenomenon, and not part of the conventional meaning 
of the conditionals.  
 Important though these theoretical debates are, this is an issue with far wider 
relevance. For instance, whether the stance is conveyed semantically or pragmatically – and, 
if pragmatically, how - bears on how strongly the speaker is committed to that stance. Recent 
theories have held that, since speakers are less committed to pragmatic meanings, such 
meanings are plausibly deniable (e.g. Fricker, 2012; Lee & Pinker, 2010; Pinker et al., 2008). 
Imagine a court case in which a key issue is whether a witness had ever had a Swiss bank 
account. Imagine, further, that the prosecuting attorney failed to follow a clear line of 
questioning and, commenting later, the witness states “If I had had a Swiss bank account, I 
would have answered a direct question about it.” This utterance appears to suggest that the 
witness did not have a Swiss bank account. But how strongly did the witness commit to that? 
And if he really did have a bank account, was his statement a lie? Experimental data suggest 





the hearer is likely to be antagonistic and when the potential costs are high (Lee & Pinker, 
2010). Data also suggest that participants prefer to trust speakers who implied (more 
technically, ‘implicated’), rather than explicitly said or presupposed, false information 
Mazzarella et al., 2018). Moreover, how the stance is conveyed may have implications for 
individual differences. For instance, researchers have been interested in the relationship 
between pragmatic reasoning and autism (Geurts, Kissine et al., 2020). 
 Our question bears on another key debate: whether there can be a single, unified 
semantic theory of indicative and subjunctive conditionals. This debate has long proved 
controversial, with some researchers advancing a unifying account (e.g. Edgington, 2008; 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Quelhas et al., 2018; Over et al., 2007; Pfeifer & Tulkki, 2017; 
Stalnaker, 1968, 1975; Spohn, 2013; Starr, 2014; Williamson, 2020) while others argue 
against it (e.g. Bennett, 2003; Lewis, 1973, 1976). This paper contributes to the debate by 
investigating salient semantic and pragmatic accounts of one key difference in meaning 
between indicative and subjunctive conditionals, the stances towards the antecedent, and 
ascertaining whether these stances belong to the conventional, context-independent, semantic 
meaning of the conditionals or their non-conventional, context-dependent, pragmatic 
meaning. In the rest of the introduction, we first outline the range of stances a conditional can 
be used to convey towards its antecedent, before previewing the experiments.  
 
The Truth/Falsity of the Antecedent: Defining Indicatives and Subjunctives 
 Theoretical and corpus-linguistic work suggests that conditionals are, in fact, 
compatible with a range of stances towards their antecedent. They can convey that the speaker 
takes the antecedent to be true, false, or somewhere in between. To illustrate, consider the 





their extensive typology, which relates the grammatical (morpho-syntactic) form of a 
conditional to its stance towards the antecedent.  
(3) “If I had a problem, I always went to my grandmother” (ibid., p. 50). 
This conditional conveys that its antecedent is known to be true. Conditionals like this, with 
factual antecedents, often describe past repetitive habits (ibid.). Compare example (3) with the 
next example:  
(4) “I hope Liverpool won their home match yesterday. If they did, they still have a 
chance of winning the championship” (ibid., p. 54).  
This conditional conveys that its antecedent is an open – a real – possibility. Compare 
example (4) with the next example:  
(5) “I would have been happy if we had found a solution” (ibid., p. 54).  
This conditional conveys that the antecedent is false in the actual world: it is counterfactual.  
 What sets the counterfactual-antecedent (5) apart from the others3 is a distinctive use 
of verbal morphology in the antecedent4. The morphology appears to be standard past perfect, 
“had found”. But this morphology does not simply situate the antecedent in a particular time: 
it is, in a sense, a "fake tense" (Iatridou, 2000). The counterfactual-antecedent refers to the 
past but uses the extra layer of past tense – the past-perfect “had” – to indicate that the 
antecedent situation did not actually obtain. This use of morphology has led von Fintel (2012) 
 
3  See also tentative-antecedent examples, such as the following, which should be read as 
referring to the future: “I would be happy if we found a solution” (Declerck & Reed, 2001, p. 
54). This conditional is tentative about the antecedent: it is possible, but unlikely, that the 
antecedent will prove true. There is “fake tense” here too, with the past-tense morphology 
conveying remoteness of possibility or tentativeness. 
4  The verbal morphology in the consequent appears less distinctive. For example, 
speakers can use the modal auxiliary (Huddleston, 2002; Mittwoch, Huddleston et al., 2002) – 
some would say past tense (e.g., Iatridou, 2000) – "would" in factual-antecedent conditionals. 
We could paraphrase example (3) as "If I had a problem, I would always go to my 
grandmother". "Would" can also appear without "have" in the consequent of counterfactual 
conditionals, as in this example: "If the colonial powers hadn't invaded, the Americas would 





to refer to counterfactuals as "additional-past conditionals". But counterfactual-antecedent 
conditionals can also occur in the following form, referring to the present:  
 (6) "If he were rich, he would be smart" (Iatridou, 2000, p. 232).  
Here the antecedent conveys counter-factuality through "were", which some class as being in 
the subjunctive mood (e.g. Starr, 2019) and others as being in a distinct "irrealis" mood 
(Huddleston, 2002; Mittwoch, Huddleston et al., 2002).  
 Following convention, we will focus on the distinction between indicative and 
subjunctive, or counterfactual, conditionals here, although the label “subjunctive” has well-
known problems (see e.g. Starr, 2019; von Fintel, 2012). We take it, moreover, that by 
"indicative" most researchers would mean conditionals like (4) above, which we will call 
"open-antecedent conditionals" to indicate that usually the speaker does not know whether the 
antecedent or consequent are true or false (Mittwoch, Huddleston et al., 2002). We take it, 
also, that by "subjunctive" or "counterfactual" most researchers would mean conditionals like 
example (5) with the distinctive extra-layering of "fake past" in the antecedent and a modal 
auxiliary "would" or "would have" in the consequent.  
 
Previous Findings 
 There is experimental data to support the theoretical and intuitive distinctions between 
indicative (open-antecedent) and subjunctive conditionals. For instance, in Thompson and 
Byrne (2002), when participants indicated "What, if anything, you think [the speaker] meant 
to imply?" by indicative and subjunctive conditionals, different patterns emerged for 
indicatives and subjunctives. Some 54% of participants took the speaker of an indicative to 
imply nothing; of the remaining participants, 24% took the speaker of an indicative to imply 
the truth of the antecedent and 44% the truth of the consequent. These data suggest that, at 





antecedent (and consequent). For subjunctives, in contrast, around half (48%) of participants 
took the speaker of a subjunctive to imply the falsity of the antecedent and around half (47%) 
the falsity of the consequent, a far higher rate than for indicatives (respectively, 2% and 1%).  
 A distinction emerges between indicatives and subjunctives in other tasks 
investigating conditional inferences (Byrne & Tasso, 1999; Thompson & Byrne, 2002). 
Moreover, in Quelhas, Rasga, and Johnson-Laird (2018) participants selected among different 
paraphrases of indicative and subjunctive conditionals. Participants tended to choose a 
paraphrase of indicative conditionals to the effect that antecedent and consequent were both 
possible, and a paraphrase of subjunctive conditionals to the effect that both antecedent and 
consequent once were possible but no longer are. A substantial minority also selected a 
paraphrase for the subjunctives to the effect that antecedent and consequent were both 
possible. Given this range of data, and further evidence from processing studies (e.g. 
Santamaria, Espino et al., 2005; De Vega, Urrutia et al., 2007; Ferguson & Sanford, 2008; 
Stewart, Haigh et al., 2009), we can grant that indicative and subjunctive conditionals can 
convey different stances towards their antecedent, with subjunctives often conveying the 
falsity of their antecedents. But just how, and when, are these stances conveyed?  
 
Entailment  
 A first, semantic possibility is that conditionals semantically entail their stances 
towards the antecedent: for instance, that subjunctives semantically entail the falsity of the 
antecedent. One sentence entails a second if the second sentence is true in every model 
satisfying the first sentence. The sentence “There is a polar bear in the zoo enclosure” entails 
“There is a mammal in the zoo enclosure”: the first cannot be true without the second also 
being true. Famous examples like (7) and (8) below, however, suggest that this constraint is 





 (7) "If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown exactly those symptoms which 
 he does in fact show" (Anderson, 1951, p. 37).  
Since a speaker of this conditional could use (7) to argue that Jones had, in fact, taken arsenic, 
the sentence does not entail that the opposite is true – i.e. that Jones did not take arsenic (von 
Fintel, 1997, 2012; Stalnaker, 1975, 2014). Such conditionals are commonly referred to as 
"Anderson conditionals"; they will feature in our experiments below.  
A similar case is example (8): 
 (8) "If the butler had done it, we would have found blood on the knife. The kitchen 
 knife was clean; therefore the butler did not do it" (Iatridou, 2000, p. 232). 
The second sentence, here, does not seem redundant: the modus tollens argument does not 
seem to beg the question. But if the first sentence had already entailed that the butler did not 
do it, the argument would have been superfluous (Iatridou, 2000, Stalnaker, 1975, 2014). 
Similarly, if subjunctives ‘A > C’ are given the truth conditions of being true if a base 
conditional (‘if A, C’) is true and the antecedent is false, we immediately run into trouble with 
modus ponens (MP), modus tollens (MT), affirmation of the consequent (AC), and denial of 






































In MP inferences we see that the conclusion is now inferred from an inconsistent premise set, 
in MT one of the premises presupposes what the conclusion is supposed to establish, in AC 
the conclusion is inconsistent with one of the premises, and in DA one of the premises is 
redundant. Normally, AC and DA are considered invalid forms of inferences, but not due to 
these problems.  
To account for the stances towards the antecedent, we need other, more flexible 
linguistic phenomena. In this paper we consider two such phenomena: presupposition and 






Two experiments, below, use classic diagnostics for being a presupposition (Experiment 1) or 
a conversational implicature (Experiment 2) to address the question of how conditionals 
convey the stances toward the antecedent. For these experiments, novel stimulus materials 
were developed which manipulate participants’ belief states (i.e. neutrality, belief, or 
disbelief) via occluded pictures. These stimulus materials were pretested to investigate 
whether participants made the appropriate belief state assumptions as a function of the picture 
shown, and whether they rank-ordered indicative and subjunctive conditionals accordingly.5  
 
Experiment 1: Presupposition 
It is a common idea that there is some difference in status between the stances of indicative 
and subjunctive conditionals towards the antecedent and other content of the conditional. 
Within mental models theory, for instance, it has been common to speak of the falsity of 
antecedent and consequent as part of the default meaning (e.g. Khemlani, Byrne, & Johnson-
Laird, 2018) but also of the "presupposed facts" (see, e.g., Byrne, 2005, 2016, 2017; Espino & 
Byrne, 2018). This notion of presupposed facts connects with a long tradition in linguistics 
and philosophy according to which counterfactual conditionals presuppose the falsity of their 
antecedents (see, e.g., Fillenbaum, 1974; Declerck & Reed, 2001; Levinson, 1981). 
Presupposition is a linguistic category that is often used for capturing further aspects of 
content that are not directly represented in a sentence’s truth conditions, which, however, 
make up a precondition for the sentence being true, or appropriately assertable. 
To presuppose information is to linguistically mark it as taken for granted (Beaver & 
Geurts, 2014) or to act as if it could be made an uncontroversially part of the shared common 
ground between speaker and interlocutor (Potts, 2007, 2015). Precise definitions of the term 
 





"presupposition" are contested. But on a common view, presuppositions are marked, 
linguistically, with presupposition triggers.6 Triggers include e.g. the following:  
 (9) factive verbs, such as "know" 
 "The reader knows that this paper is fantastic" presupposes that the paper in question 
 is fantastic. 
 (10) aspectual verbs, such as "continue" 
 "The reader continued to enjoy the paper" presupposes that the reader was enjoying 
 the paper.  
 (11) definite descriptions, such as “The [Noun Phrase]” 
 “The broken glass glittered in the sunlight” presupposes that there was broken glass.    
In some lists, one would also see the antecedent of counterfactual conditionals (e.g. Levinson, 
1981) but, as we will see, their inclusion is contentious. Some researchers also argue that the 
openness of the indicative conditionals is due to a presupposition (see e.g. Declerck & Reed, 
2001, Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2019). If presuppositions convey the different stances of 
indicatives and subjunctives towards their antecedent, then the presuppositions attach to some 
element of the antecedent: presumably, the morphological form of the main verb in the 
antecedent. How well, then, does a presupposition account for intuitions and linguistic data? 
To answer this question, we must consider a characteristic known as ‘projection’. This 
characteristic is at work in examples (12) and (13):  
 (12) "The East German ambassador laughed."  
 (13) "The East German ambassador did not laugh."  
 
6  This is a simplification. Some theories take presuppositions to be more pragmatic: to 
be performed by the speaker, rather than triggered conventionally (Stalnaker, 1972, 1974, 
2014). There is also debate about the extent to which presuppositions can be wholly 
conventional as attaching to particular lexical items or whether they can be reconstructed from 





Here there is a presupposition trigger, the definite description “The East German 
ambassador”, which presupposes the existence of the said ambassador at the relevant time. In 
(13), this trigger is embedded under negation, but the presupposition survives: it projects 
under negation. Such projection behavior is a hallmark of presuppositions, and it is not one 
that is found with semantic entailments (Simons, 2006). Indeed, it is a classic diagnostic test 
for being a presupposition to see whether information projects under various operators 
(Beaver & Geurts, 2014). In the so-called "family of sentences test" (see, e.g., Kadmon, 
2001), one considers whether a candidate for being a presupposition survives in a set of 
related sentences: in negation, questioning, embedding under modals, and embedding in the 
antecedent of a conditional. Table 1 illustrates this test for the East German ambassador 
examples, and how the test might apply to indicative and subjunctive conditionals.  
Table 1. Family of Sentences Test 
 Projects?      
Test Sentence There was 
laughter 
There is an 
East German 
ambassador 
Speaker is open to the 
possibility that the East German 
ambassador will laugh  
Speaker doubts that the 
East German 
ambassador laughed 
The East German 
ambassador did not 
laugh. 
No Yes It is not the case that if the East 
German ambassador laughs… 
It is not the case that if 
the East German 
ambassador had 
laughed…. 
Did the East 
German ambassador 
laugh? 
No Yes Will the guest be offended, if 
the East German ambassador 
laughs? 
Would the guest have 
been offended, if the East 
German ambassador had 
laughed? 
Possibly, the East 
German ambassador 
laughed 
No Yes Possibly, if the East German 
ambassador laughs… 
Possibly, if the East 
German ambassador had 
laughed… 
Diagnosis  Entailment Presupposition  Unclear  Unclear  
 
A range of existing empirical work has used such embedding to test for projection. For 
instance, studies have shown projection under negation for the presuppositions of factive 
verbs “realize” and “know” – i.e. the truth of the complement (Chemla & Bott, 2013); for the 
presupposition of “stop” – i.e. that “stop X” presupposes “used to X” (Romoli & Schwarz, 
2015); and for the presuppositions of “the” and “win” – i.e. “the X” presupposes X’s 





 However, it turns out that presuppositions do not always survive; presuppositions that 
project can sometimes nevertheless be directly denied (Simons, 2006; Kadmon, 2001). For 
instance, example (14) directly denies the presupposition in example (13): 
 (14) "The East German ambassador did not laugh. There is no East German 
 ambassador, because East Germany no longer exists."  
Importantly, though, direct denial only seems to work when the presupposition trigger is 
embedded under an operator (Beaver & Geurts, 2014). Compare the successful denial in (14), 
where the presupposition trigger is embedded under negation, with the attempted but 
infelicitous denial that follows (15):   
 (15) "The East German ambassador laughed. There is no East German 
 ambassador."   
These rather specific contexts, then, do not undermine the use of projection as a diagnostic 
test. Can projection behavior, then, account for the stances towards the antecedent conveyed 
by conditionals? With indicative conditionals, there seems to be no great problem. If we 
ultimately want a theory that can allow all stances towards the antecedent, we might wonder 
whether presuppositions can do the required work: whether there are distinct triggers for the 
different stances. But there are promising differences in form between conditionals that 
convey different stances on the truth of the antecedent which might serve as triggers (see e.g. 
Declerck & Reed, 2001). But with subjunctive conditionals, there seem to be considerable 
difficulties. As we have seen, presuppositions can be cancelled through direct denial when 
they are embedded under an operator. But a presupposition account predicts that the falsity of 
the antecedent should be conveyed when there is no embedding. Examples (7) and (8) already 
challenges this notion via their cancellation of the falsity of the antecedent of the respective 





In Experiment 1, we test the presupposition account more systematically. Experiment 
1 explores whether the stances towards the antecedent – neutrality for indicatives, and 
disbelief for subjunctives – exhibit the projection behavior of presuppositions. To investigate 
this, we apply the family of sentences test (Kadmon, 2001) to see whether these belief-state 
assumptions project past negation operators (“it is not the case that…”), possibility-modals 
(“possible, …”), and interrogatives (“Martin, do you think that … ?”). More specifically, we 
test: (1) for stand-alone indicatives, whether neutrality towards the antecedent projects past 
these three operators; (2) for stand-alone subjunctives, whether disbelief towards the 
antecedent projects past the operators; and (3) for Anderson conditionals, whether belief 
in/neutrality towards the antecedent projects past the operators.  
Translated into a statistical model, the presupposition hypothesis holds that there 
should be no differences across the various types of operator (referred to as the “DV Type 
factor” below). This model (M5) is tested against a collection of other models which allow for 
differences between the operators, as explained below.  
Method 
Participants, and sampling procedure shared for all experiments 
The experiment was conducted over the Internet to obtain a large and demographically 
diverse sample. A total of 118 people completed the experiment. The participants were 
sampled through the Internet platform Mechanical Turk from the USA, UK, Canada, and 
Australia. They were paid a small amount of money for their participation. The following a 
priori exclusion criteria were used: not having English as native language, completing the 
task in less than 240 seconds or in more than 3600 seconds, failing to answer at least one of 
two simple SAT comprehension questions correctly in a warm-up phase, and answering ‘not 
serious at all’ to the question 'how serious do you take your participation' at the beginning of 





from 21 to 65. 38.46% of participants identified as female; 61.54% identified as male. 79.49 
% indicated that the highest level of education that they had completed was an undergraduate 
degree or higher. 
Design 
The experiment had a within-participants design with the following factors varying 
within participant: DV Type (assert vs. negation vs. possible vs. question), Prior (high 
probability (H) vs. low probability (L)) and Conditional Type (indicative vs. subjunctive). To 
allow for four trial replications for each cell of the design, each participant in total went 
through 64 within-subject conditions. 
Materials and Procedure for All the Experiments   
For a pilot study,7 a pool of 24 different pictures was created, and 16 pictures selected 
for further studies based on which pictures had the highest rate of inducing the intended belief 
state assumptions consistently across the four conditions. In all the experiments reported 
below, the various within-participants conditions were thus randomly assigned to a pool of the 
16 different pictures. Random assignment was performed without replacement such that each 
participant saw a different picture for each condition. This ensured that the mapping of 
condition to picture was counterbalanced across participants preventing confounds of 
condition and picture content.  
To reduce the dropout rate during the experiment, participants first went through three 
pages stating our academic affiliations, posing two SAT comprehension questions in a warm-
up phase, and presenting a seriousness check asking how careful the participants would be in 
their responses (Reips, 2002). Moreover, to ensure that the pictures were displayed properly if 
the participants completed the study on a smartphone, participants were asked to turn their 
smartphone in horizontal orientation, if they were using one.  
 





The 16 possible pictures all implemented the four conditions indicated in Table 2. The 
pictures feature familiar places like bedrooms, cafés, and kitchens, where we stereotypically 
have expectations about likely objects (e.g. a pendant lamp in a bedroom) and unlikely objects 
(e. g. a surfboard in a bedroom). As Table 2 shows, the pictures additionally featured grey 
boxes that manipulate the assertability of indicative and subjunctive conditionals. These boxes 
operationalize the Occlusion variable (see also Baratgin, Over et al., 2013): 
Table 2. Stimulus Materials and Experimental Conditions 
Indicative, occluded Subjunctive, not occluded 
P(there is a pendant lamp in the bedroom) = H 
IF there is a  pendant lamp in the  




IF there had been a pendant lamp in 
the bedroom, THEN it would have 
hung above the bed, where indeed 
something is hanging.                  
 
P(there is a surfboard in the bedroom) = L 
IF there is a  surfboard in the 
bedroom, THEN it stands against  
the wall 
 
IF there had been a surfboard in the 
bedroom, THEN it would have stood 
against the wall. 
 
Note. ‘H’ = high prio r probability; ‘L’ = low prior probability. Note that the upper                                 
right corner is an example of the so-called “Anderson conditional”. 
 
To create a situation in which indicative conditionals are assertable (left column), we used a 
grey box to hide the location specified by the consequent of the conditional. For instance, due 
to the grey box in the lower left picture, participants cannot verify for certain whether there is 
a surfboard standing against the wall, but they are expected to deem it unlikely. Our pilot 





To create a situation in which subjunctive conditionals are assertable (right column), 
we either placed a transparent grey box where the object was supposed to be (upper right 
corner), or a non-transparent grey box in an irrelevant location that had no bearing on the 
presence of the object mentioned in the conditional (lower right corner). For instance, when 
assessing the conditional ‘If there had been a surfboard, then it would have stood against the 
wall’ based on the picture in the lower right corner, participants can see for certain that there 
is no surfboard standing against the wall, and thus maintain disbelief in the presence of a 
surfboard on the picture. In contrast, the transparent8 grey box in the upper right corner was 
introduced to create a situation for asserting so-called Anderson conditionals (e.g. “If there 
had been a pendant lamp in the bedroom, then it would have hung above the bed, where 
indeed something is hanging”) which take the subjunctive form but are asserted without 
doubting the antecedent. Due to the transparent grey box, participants can verify that there is 
an object that appears to fit the description at the place mentioned in the consequent. 
Nevertheless, the lack of full transparency is intended to make the guarded form of the 
subjunctive mood for the conditional assertion sound more natural. 
A feature of the conditionals in Table 2 is that the consequent depends for its truth on 
the antecedent. The conditionals were designed in this way, because it enabled us to 
manipulate belief states based on the pictures and the grey boxes in a way that would also 
permit the formulation of Anderson conditionals. Since Experiments 1 and 2 only concern 
belief states targeting the antecedent, this feature does not matter for their purpose.  
 
Procedure specific to Experiment 1 
 
8  Note that in their rendering on the computer screen, the pictures were larger and so the 





The experiment was split into 16 blocks, each implementing one of the four trial 
replications of the four Prior × Conditional Type within-subject conditions. For each block a 
picture was randomly assigned from the pool of 16 pictures used. The order of the blocks was 
randomized and there were no breaks between blocks. Within a given block, participants were 
presented with the four DV Types on separate pages in random order with the same picture.  
Before beginning with the actual experiment, participants completed four practice 
trials with one of the excluded pictures, where it was emphasized that it was important to pay 
attention to subtle differences between the wordings on the various pages. To complete these 
trials, participants were given the following instruction: 
In the following, you are going to see pictures and statements made by Dennis 
concerning the pictures shown. Your task is to indicate which assumptions you would 
make concerning what Dennis believes based on what he says. 
On each page, participants were then presented with a statement by Dennis in response to the 
selected image, corresponding to the within-subject condition displayed at the moment. For 
instance, a participant might first have seen the following image: 
 
Together with the following statement: 
 Dennis: 
 Possibly, IF there is a monitor in the office, THEN it stands on the table. (possible) 
The task of the participants was to indicate which of the following three statements best 





 Dennis disbelieves that there is a monitor in the office. 
 Dennis neither believes nor disbelieves that there is a monitor in the office. 
 Dennis believes that there is a monitor in the office. 
On the three pages that followed, participants were given the same task with the following 
three statements in random order:  
 IF there is a monitor in the office, THEN it stands on the table. (assert) 
It is NOT the case that IF there is a monitor in the office, THEN it stands on the table. 
(negation) 
Martin, do you think that IF there is a monitor in the office, THEN it stands on the 
table? (question) 
Results 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for participants’ belief state ascriptions. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics. 
 Assert Negation Possible Question 
Indicative, HH 50.96% Neutral 50.32% Disbelief 63.46% Neutral 73.40% Neutral 
Indicative, LL 57.69% Neutral 48.08% Disbelief 63.46% Neutral 70.19% Neutral 
Subjunctive, HH 37.18% Belief 55.45% Disbelief 37.50% Neutral 42.95% Neutral 
Subjunctive, LL 45.83% Disbelief 55.45% Disbelief 47.12% Neutral 54.17% Neutral 
Note. Due to the categorical nature of the response variable, the descriptive statistics is reported as 
percentages of the modal values. ‘HH’ = high prior probability of antecedent and consequent; ‘LL’ = low 
prior probability of antecedent and consequent. 
 
Given the design, there were replicates for each participant and picture. Hence, it was 
not appropriate to assume that the data were independently and identically distributed. 
Accordingly, linear mixed-effects models with crossed random effects for intercepts and 
slopes by participants and by pictures were used (Baayen, Davidson, et al., 2008).9 This 
analysis was conducted using the statistical programming language R (R Core Team, 2013) 
and the package brms for mixed-effects models in Bayesian statistics (Bürkner, 2017) with a 
 





multinominal likelihood and a logit link function for categorical regression. The following 
family of models was fit to the data, which vary in their fixed effects:  
(M1) a maximal model that treats participants’ selections as a function of the DV Type 
factor (assert vs. negation vs. possible vs. question), the Prior factor (high vs. low), the 
Conditional factor (indicative vs. subjunctive) and their three and two-way interaction. 
(M2) a model that is obtained from the maximal model (M1) by removing the three-
way interaction. 
(M3) a model that is obtained from (M2) by removing the two-way DV Type:Prior 
interaction. 
(M4) a model that is obtained from (M3) by removing the two-way Conditional:DV 
Type interaction. 
(M5) a model that is obtained from (M4) by completely removing the DV type factor. 
(M5) thereby implements the presupposition model. 
Hypotheses concerning the presence/absence of effects are tested here and below by setting 
coefficients of the maximal model (M1) equal to zero. In this way, evidence in favour of e.g. 
the H0 that there is no simple effect of the DV type factor can be quantified in terms of Bayes 
factors, where classical significance testing would only have permitted us to conclude that H0 
could not be rejected (Wagenmakers et al., 2018). To be able to quantify the strength of 
evidence both against and in favour of H0, we rely on the following qualitative interpretation 
of Bayes factors (Lee & Wagenmarkers, 2014): (Anecdotal evidence for H1) 
1
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following ratio: 𝐵𝐹𝐻0𝐻1 =  
1
𝐵𝐹𝐻1𝐻0  
. Table 4 reports the performance of the models as 
quantified by the leave-one-out cross validation criterion and WAIC. 
                             Table 4. Model Comparison 
 LOOIC Δelpd SE WAIC Weight 
M1 8150.2 0 -- 8147.7 0.611 
M2 8152.3 -1.1 3.7 8149.8 0.213 
M3 8152.6 -1.2 5.3 8150.3 0.177 
M4 8202.8 -26.3 10.1 8200.5 0.000 
M5 8795.1 -322.5 27.6 8793.2 0.000 
Note. LOOIC = leave-one-out cross-validation information criterion. WAIC 
= Watanabe-Akaike information criterion. Weight = Akaike weight of 
LOOIC. ‘elpd’ = expected log predictive density is a  measure of the 
expected out-of-sample predictive accuracy. 
The information criteria showed a preference for M1-M3 and clearly rejected the 
model (M5) corresponding to the presupposition hypothesis of no effect of embedding 
indicative and subjunctive conditionals under negation, possibility, and interrogation 
operators. Since the differences between M1-M3 were small, Figure 1 plots the posterior 






Figure 1. Posterior Predictions based on M1-M3. The posterior predictive probabilities 
of selecting belief/neutrality/disbelief across within-subject conditions are displayed. 
‘High’ = high prior probability of antecedent and consequent. ‘Low’ = low prior 
probability of antecedent and consequent. Error-bars represent 95% credible intervals. 
 
The results indicate that there was a contrast between ‘assert’ and the other DV types 
across conditions. In particular, strong evidence could be obtained that use of 'Negation' 
increased the posterior probability of Disbelief (bNegation_Disbelief = 2.21, 95%-CI [1.72, 2.72], 
BFH0H1 < .001) and that embedding under 'Possible' and 'Question' both increased the posterior 
probability of 'Neutral' (bPossible_Neutral = 0.77, 95%-CI [0.35, 1.18], BFH0H1 = .02; bQuestion_Neutral 
= 1.58, 95%-CI [1.13, 2.03], BFH0H1 < .001). There was, moreover, weaker evidence of a 





posterior probability of selecting the ‘Neutral’ category for a specific level of the Condition 
and Prior factors (bSubjunctive:PriorLL:Question_Neutral = 1.21, 95%-CI [0.29, 2.12], BFH0H1 = .37). 
 
Discussion 
As a manipulation check, we can gauge the belief-state attributions of stand-alone assertions 
for their plausibility across conditions. What we find is a general tendency to attribute 
doxastic neutrality towards the antecedent for indicative conditionals (across Prior levels), 
disbelief/neutrality in the counterfactual conditionals (subjunctive, low prior), and an elevated 
posterior probability of selecting ‘belief’ with the Anderson conditionals (subjunctive, high 
prior) compared to the counterfactual conditionals (Table 3, Figure 1). Since these belief-state 
attributions overall match prior theoretical expectations, the results from Experiment 1 can be 
used to test the presupposition hypothesis. Translated into a statistical model, the 
presupposition hypothesis holds that there should be no differences across the various levels 
of the DV Type factor. Accordingly, if the presupposition hypothesis had accounted for the 
data, we would expect M5 to be the winning model. In contrast, M5 turned out to be the worst 
fitting model. What we find instead is that the DV Type factor enters into an interaction with 
the Conditional factor, and that participants attribute somewhat different belief states 
depending on whether the conditional is embedded under an operator. Negation increases the 
probability of attributing disbelief; Possible and Question increase the probability of 
attributing neutrality. The results thus speak against the presupposition hypothesis.  
 That these effects were found most strongly with projection past the negation operator 
is not surprising, since embedding under a possibility modal and an interrogative has the same 
valence as the bare assertion case, when the latter expresses neutrality. But in fact it was 
found that both the possibility modal and the interrogative contributed to attenuating the 





As Experiment 1 shows, presupposition as defined by the classic family of sentences 
test is not a flexible enough phenomenon to handle the different stances towards the 
antecedent. This finding naturally prompts us to investigate a more flexible phenomenon: 
conversational implicature.  
 
Experiment 2: Conversational Implicature 
Conversational implicatures are the paradigm case of natural-language pragmatics. They arise 
when a speaker implicitly and intentionally communicates something other than the 
conventional meaning of the utterance.  
Take the following example: "I ate most of the pizza" (Birner, 2013, p.45). The 
speaker literally states only that they ate most of the pizza but appears to convey – to 
conversationally implicate – that they did not eat all of it. Implicatures, it is said, arise because 
of how we expect conversations to go: we expect speakers to behave cooperatively. The 
classical account, here, is Grice (1989): we expect speakers to say enough, but not too much; 
to avoid saying false or un-evidenced things; to be relevant; to avoid obscurity and ambiguity, 
and to be brief and orderly. Implicatures can arise when these expectations are observed or 
flouted – ostentatiously not observed. Let us assume that the speaker is cooperative and, in 
particular, has said enough, but not too much (has respected the Maxim of Quantity). Our 
cooperative speaker did not make the stronger statement “I ate all of the pizza”, and so – we 
presume - does not believe that the stronger statement is true. As hearers, we therefore 
conclude that the speaker did not eat all of the pizza.  
Different theories account for implicatures with different theoretical constructs (see, 
e.g., Horn, 1984; Levinson, 2000; Sperber & Wilson, 1995), but a central property is that 
implicatures are defeasible: they can be cancelled without producing a contradiction (Blome-





fact, all of it.”  That implicatures are so cancellable makes them an attractive option for 
explaining the different stances conveyed by indicatives and subjunctives. For indicative 
conditionals, some have proposed that it is an implicature that conveys the "open possibility" 
sense of the antecedent (Mittwoch, Huddleston et al., 2002), a proposal that obviates the need 
for distinct presupposition triggers for each stance on the antecedent. More commonly, 
researchers have proposed that it is an implicature that conveys the "not known" sense of the 
antecedent (e.g. Grice, 1989; Mittwoch, Huddleston, & Collins, 2002). After all, if the speaker 
of "If A, C" had known that both "A" and "C" were true, they could have said simply "A and 
C"; that the speaker did not do so suggests that they do not know (Grice, 1989).  
 For subjunctives, the implicature account plays an important role. On this account, 
speakers can use subjunctive conditionals to conversationally implicate, in context, that the 
antecedent is false. With this account, we can accept, for instance, that example (6) – "If he 
were rich, he would be smart" – can sometimes, perhaps often, suggest that the "he" in 
question is not rich (or smart), but the sentence need not give rise to this implicature. 
Implicature-based accounts differ in detail, but have attracted numerous supporters (e.g. 
Iatridou, 2000; Ippolito, 2003; Leahy, 2011, 2018; Mittwoch, Huddleston et al., 2002).  
 The cancellability of conservational implicatures offers a diagnostic test: if 
information is conveyed by a conversational implicature, then it should be cancellable. 
Skovgaard-Olsen, Collins et al. (2019) designed a cancellation task that applied this 
diagnostic test. In this cancellation task, the candidate for being an implicature is uttered by a 
fictional character. For the current research question, a character, Samuel, might say:  
Samuel: “If there had been a pendant lamp in the bedroom, then it would have hung 
above the bed.”  
Samuel then attempts to cancel the potential implicature: that there is not, in fact, a pendant 





and participants are asked whether they agree with Louis. If this information is an actual 
implicature, then it should be possible for Samuel to cancel it: participants should disagree 
with Louis.   
Alongside the candidate implicature are two baselines. The first baseline is an 
uncontroversial implicature: Samuel might say that it is “possible” that there is such a lamp, 
but deny suggesting that it is not highly likely. This baseline is an instance of a modal scalar 
implicature: when a speaker uses a weaker modal term, “possible”, they may implicate, or be 
mistaken for implicating, that a stronger modal term would be inappropriate. Hence, the 
speaker here would be suggesting that it is possible but not highly likely that there is such a 
lamp. Scalar implicatures are readily cancellable. The second baseline is an entailment: 
Samuel states that “this is a picture of a bedroom AND …” before going on to deny 
suggesting that it is a picture of bedroom. This should not be cancelable.  
The cancellation task allows us to ask whether cancelling the stance towards the 
antecedent is more like cancelling a scalar implicature or cancelling an entailment. It therefore 
allows us to experimentally test whether indicatives and subjunctives convey their stances 




The same sampling procedure and exclusion criteria were used as in Experiment 1. A total of 
120 people completed the experiment. Since some of the exclusion criteria were overlapping, 
the final sample consisted of 93 participants. Mean age was 34.46 years, ranging from 19 to 





preferred not to respond. 65.59 % indicated that the highest level of education that they had 
completed was an undergraduate degree or higher.10 
Design 
The experiment had a within-subject design with three factors: Occlusion (with two 
levels: occluded vs. not-occluded), Prior (with two levels: high (H) vs. low (L)) and 
Cancellation Type (with three levels: scalar vs. entailment vs. belief-state). To allow for four 
trial replications for each cell of the design, each participant in total went through 48 within-
subject conditions.  
Materials and Procedure  
The experiment was split into 16 blocks of three pages, one block for each level of the 
Occlusion × Prior factors and their four trial replications. Each block contained one page for 
each of the three levels of the Cancellation Type factor. 16 different pictures were randomly 
assigned to each of the 16 blocks. The order of the blocks was randomized anew for each 
participant and there were no breaks between the blocks. The three pages within each block 
were randomized and showed one within-subject condition from the pool of 16 selected 
pictures with different types of cancellations. 
We cued participants to the intended interpretation of the cancellations with 
instructions and practice trials. For Experiment 2, the participants were given the following 
instructions together with four sample items:  
In the following you will see several pictures of familiar settings (e.g. bathrooms, 
kitchens). As you will notice, different parts of the pictures are hidden by grey boxes. 
Note that some of these boxes are transparent.  
The responses we will ask you to make relate to a picture shown and a corresponding 
dialogue between Samuel and Louis. In the dialogues, Samuel will say what he thinks 
 





is true – what he believes. Sometimes he will indicate what he thinks is false – what he 
disbelieves. And sometimes he will indicate that he doesn’t have a view  – that he is 
open to either believing or disbelieving it. Louis in turn accuses Samuel of 
contradicting himself. It will be your task to evaluate Louis' objection. Is he right?  
The task of the participants was to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with 
Louis' statement on a five-point Likert scale {strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree}. Before beginning the experiment proper, participants moreover saw three 
practice trials, where we emphasized that it was important to pay attention to both subtle 
differences between the wordings of the various types of cancellations used in the experiment 
and the varying placement of the grey boxes.     
On the following three pages, participants were presented with one of the three types 
of cancellation in random order (perceived contradiction of cancellation of entailment, of 
scalar implicature, and of belief state assumptions). The task of the participants was always to 
assess the extent to which they agreed with Louis' claim that Samuel contradicted himself. 
Using the bedroom picture from Table 3, the three types of cancellation were implemented 
across the four conditions as shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Cancellation Types in Experiment 2 
Entailment Scalar Implicature Belief State 
Indicative, occluded H 
Samuel:  
This is a  picture of a  bedroom AND 
IF there is a  pendant lamp in the 
bedroom, THEN it hangs above the 
bed  
...but I am not suggesting that this is 
a  picture of a  bedroom. 
Samuel:  
This is a  picture of a  bedroom AND 
IF there is a  pendant lamp in the 
bedroom, THEN it is possible that it 
hangs above the bed  
...but I am not suggesting that if so, 
it isn’t highly likely that it hangs 
above the bed. 
Samuel:  
This is a  picture of a  bedroom AND 
IF there is a  pendant lamp in the 
bedroom, THEN it hangs above the 
bed  
...but I am not suggesting that I am 
open to believing or disbelieving 
that there is a  pendant lamp in the 
bedroom. 
 Indicative, occluded L  
Samuel:  
This is a  picture of a  bedroom AND 
IF there is a  surfboard in the 
bedroom, THEN it stands against the 
wall  
Samuel:  
This is a  picture of a  bedroom AND 
IF there is a  surfboard in the 
bedroom, THEN it is possible that it 
stands against the wall  
Samuel:  
This is a  picture of a  bedroom AND 
IF there is a  surfboard in the 






...but I am not suggesting that this is 
a  picture of a  bedroom. 
...but I am not suggesting that if so, 
it isn’t highly likely that it stands 
against the wall. 
...but I am not suggesting that I am 
open to believing or disbelieving 
that there is a  surfboard in the 
bedroom. 
Subjunctive, not occluded H 
Samuel:  
This is a  picture of a  bedroom AND 
IF there had been a pendant lamp in 
the bedroom, THEN it would have 
hung above the bed, where indeed 
something is hanging  
...but I am not suggesting that this is 
a  picture of a  bedroom. 
Samuel:  
This is a  picture of a  bedroom AND 
IF there had been a pendant lamp in 
the bedroom, THEN it is possible it 
would have hung above the bed, 
where indeed something is hanging  
...but I am not suggesting that if so, 
it isn’t highly likely that it would 
have hung above the bed. 
Samuel:  
This is a  picture of a  bedroom AND 
IF there had been a pendant lamp in 
the bedroom, THEN it would have 
hung above the bed, where indeed 
something is hanging  
...but I am not suggesting that I 
doubt that there is a  pendant lamp in 
the bedroom. 
 Subjunctive, not occluded L  
Samuel:  
This is a  picture of a  bedroom AND 
IF there had been a surfboard in the 
bedroom, THEN it would have stood 
against the wall  
...but I am not suggesting that this is 
a  picture of a  bedroom. 
Samuel:  
This is a  picture of a  bedroom AND 
IF there had been a surfboard in the 
bedroom, THEN it is possible it 
would have stood against the wall  
...but I am not suggesting that if so, 
it isn’t highly likely that it would 
have stood against the wall. 
Samuel:  
This is a  picture of a  bedroom AND 
IF there had been a surfboard in the 
bedroom, THEN it would have stood 
against the wall 
...but I am not suggesting that I 
doubt that there is a  surfboard in the 
bedroom. 
Note. For the entailments, the conclusion of And Elimination was cancelled. ‘H’ = high prior probability. ‘L’ = low 
prior probability. 
 
The goal of the experiment was to find out whether cancellations of assumptions concerning 
belief states of indicative and subjunctive conditionals are more like cancellations of 
entailments or cancellations of scalar implicatures. 
 
Results 
Some initial descriptive statistics are reported in Table 6.  
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics 
 Entailment Belief-State Scalar Implicature 
Indicative H Mdn = 5, MAD = 0  Mdn = 2, MAD = 1.48 Mdn = 3, MAD = 1.48 
Indicative L Mdn = 5, MAD = 0  Mdn = 2, MAD = 1.48 Mdn = 3, MAD = 1.48 
Subjunctive H Mdn = 5, MAD = 0  Mdn = 2, MAD = 1.48 Mdn = 3, MAD = 1.48 
Subjunctive L Mdn = 5, MAD = 0  Mdn = 2, MAD = 1.48 Mdn = 3, MAD = 1.48 
Note. Due to the ordinal nature of the perceived contradiction ratings, the descriptive statistics are 
reported via  medians (Mdn) and median absolute deviations (MAD).  
 
In the analysis below, we have collapsed across the levels of the Priors factor to focus 





subjunctive conditionals (investigated in the not-occluded conditions), which is the contrast of 
most direct importance. 
Given the design, there were replicates for each participant and pictures. Hence, it was 
not appropriate to assume that the data were independently and identically distributed. 
Accordingly, the appropriate analysis was to use linear mixed-effects models, with crossed 
random effects for intercepts and slopes by participants and by pictures (Baayen, Davidson, et 
al., 2008). This analysis was conducted using R-package brms for mixed-effects models in 
Bayesian statistics (Bürkner, 2017). The following family of nested models was fit to the data:  
(M6) a maximal model that treats participants’ ratings of perceived contradiction as a 
function of the Cancellation factor (scalar implicature vs. entailment vs. belief state), 
Sentence Type (subjunctive vs. indicative), and their interaction. 
(M7) a model that is obtained from the maximal model (M6) by removing the two-
way interaction. 
(M8) a model that is obtained from (M7) by removing the simple effect for the 
Sentence factor. 
(M9) a model that is obtained from (M8) by removing the simple effect for the 
Cancellation factor. 
Effects of the Cancellation Type factor are of theoretical importance for testing the 
conversational implicature hypothesis. In selecting the class of models above, we investigated 
whether the effects of the Cancellation Type factor varies across indicative and subjunctive 
conditionals. Since the responses obtained from the five-point Likert scale are ordinal 
responses, the responses were modelled as generated by thresholds set on a latent continuous 
scale via a cumulative model and a logit link function (Bürkner & Vuorre, 2019). Table 7 
reports the performance of the models as quantified by the leave-one-out cross validation 





                             Table 7. Model Comparison 
 LOOIC Δelpd SE WAIC Weight 
M6 9271.5 0 --  9265.5 0.43 
M7 9273.1 -0.8 1.9  9267.3 0.19 
M8 9271.7 -0.1 1.9  9265.9 0.39 
M9 9296.0 -12.3 2.6  9288.8 0.00 
Note. LOOIC = leave-one-out cross-validation information criterion. 
WAIC = Watanabe-Akaike information criterion. Weight = Akaike 
weight of LOOIC. ‘elpd’ = expected log predictive density is a  measure 
of the expected out-of-sample predictive accuracy. 
The modest differences between M6-M8 indicate that the difference between 
indicative and subjunctive conditionals did not matter much for participants’ perceived degree 
of contradiction. In contrast, the clear rejection of M9 indicates that strong differences in the 
type of Cancellation were found. Since the differences between M6-M8 were small, Figure 2 
plots the posterior predictions of all three models as weighted by their respective model 
weights from Table 7. Note that, as M8 excludes the interaction and the simple effect of 
Sentence type, the plot collapses across the Sentence factor. For purposes of plotting, we here 
aggregate “Disagree strongly”/”Disagree” and “Agree strongly”/”Agree”, although these 
response options were fitted separately above. 
 
Figure 2. Posterior Predictions of M6-M8. Level of (dis)agreement that Samuel was contradicting 
himself, split by type of cancellation (of the belief state, entailment, and scalar implicature). This 





“Strongly agree” and “Agree” ordinal categories were aggregated to “Agree” and “Strongly disagree” 
and “Disagree” were aggregated to “Disagree”. Error-bars represent 95% credible intervals. 
 
As a manipulation check, it can be observed across sentences that participants clearly 
distinguished between attempts to cancel a commitment to entailments and conversational 
implicatures, for both indicative and subjunctive conditionals. It was thus found that 
cancellations of entailments were viewed as more contradictory than cancellations of scalar 
implicatures for both indicatives  (bEntail - Scalar = 4.59, 90% CI [3.93, 5.30], BFH1H0  > 100)  
and subjunctives (bEntail - Scalar = 5.01, 90% CI [4.26, 5.77], BFH1H0  > 100). 
Next, the cancellation of belief states were compared to these two baselines. Strong 
evidence was found that cancellations of belief states were viewed as less contradictory than 
cancellations of entailments for both indicatives (bBelief - Entail = -5.29, 90% CI [-5.99, -4.58], 
BFH1H0  > 100)  and subjunctives (bBelief - Entail = -5.30, 90% CI [-6.08, -4.53], BFH1H0  > 100).  
In addition, moderate evidence was found that cancellations of belief states were 
viewed as less contradictory than cancellations of scalar implicatures for indicatives (bBelief - 
Scalar = -.70, 90% CI [-1.07, -.30], BFH1H0  = 9.07) but not for subjunctives (bBelief - Scalar = -.28, 
90% CI [-.65, .08], BFH1H0  = .18), where indeed the H0 of no difference between the 
cancellation of belief state assumptions and scalar implicatures was supported. 
 
Discussion 
The analysis validated our two baselines for the cancellation test by showing that there was 
very strong evidence that commitments to entailments were viewed as more cancellable than 
commitments to scalar implicatures. Next, our results showed that speakers can cancel, 
without contradicting themselves, the neutrality towards the antecedent of an indicative 
conditional and the disbelief towards the antecedent of a subjunctive conditional. Indeed, 
cancelling a commitment to the suggested belief state was viewed as less contradictory than 





conditionals, strong evidence was found that the belief state assumptions concerning the 
antecedent was just as cancellable as scalar implicatures. The data thus supports the view that 
a conversational implicature is present in both indicative and subjunctive conditionals. 
Differences in the content of these conversational implicatures may accordingly help account 
for the meaning differences between indicative and subjunctive conditionals. Converging 
evidence for this conclusion was found in Experiment 1, where the posterior probability of 
selecting ‘Belief’ was increased from subjunctives used to convey counterfactual conditionals 
to subjunctives used as Anderson conditionals. 
 
General Discussion 
It is a familiar point that indicative and subjunctive conditionals differ with respect to 
the belief-state status of the antecedent, illustrated by Adams’ (1970) Oswald-Kennedy pair, 
where one can consistently accept the first while rejecting the second: 
(indicative)   If Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, someone else did. 
(counterfactual) If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, someone else would have. 
The formulation of this minimal pair, with two conditionals differing in meaning, has led to a 
number of attempts to either provide a unifying account of indicative and subjunctive 
conditionals (Stalnaker, 1975; Edgington, 2008; von Fintel, 2012; Spohn, 2013; Starr, 2014; 
Williamson, 2020), argue why disjunct accounts are needed (Lewis, 1973, 1976; Bennett, 
2003), or argue for a unifying account by questioning that this indeed constitutes a minimal 
pair (Quelhas et al., 2018). For proponents of the first approach, it is tempting to formulate 
one semantics of conditionals and look to linguistic phenomena closer to pragmatics, like 
conversational implicatures or presuppositions, to account for the meaning differences 
between the two types of sentences above. Our findings cast light on the plausibility of such 






Conversational Implicatures and Presuppositions   
Throughout Experiments 1 and 2, it was found that a conversational implicature best accounts 
for the diverging belief state assumptions concerning the antecedents of indicative and 
subjunctive conditionals. Central to the evidence is the cancellability of the belief states: 
speakers could cancel the neutrality towards the antecedent in indicatives and the disbelief 
towards the antecedent in subjunctives without participants perceiving a contradiction.  
According to the Stalnaker-Karttunen-Heim approach to presuppositions, a sentence 
carrying a presupposition can only be felicitously uttered in contexts that entail the 
presupposition (Kadmon, 2001, Ch. 5), or which can be updated so as to entail the 
presupposition (Simons, 2006). On this view, cancellation of presuppositions cannot be 
accounted for, if presuppositions are supposed to be entailed by the context on a classical, 
monotonic consequence relation. In contrast, on the so-called Cancellation Approach of 
Gazdar (1979) and Soames (1982), presuppositions are defeasible and can be cancelled by 
contextual assumptions or prior conversational implicatures (Kadmon, 2001, Ch. 6). 
However, as Beaver and Geurts (2014) note, it appears that the main examples of 
cancellation of presuppositions concern cases, where the sentence carrying the presupposition 
has been embedded in a compound sentence. For instance, in examples like “If it’s the knave 
that stole the tarts, then I’m a Dutchman: there is no knave here”, the presupposition of the 
embedded sentence that there is a knave is cancelled. In contrast, cancelling unembedded 
presuppositions is typically seen to be as infelicitous as cancelling a commitment to an 
entailment (e.g. “It’s the knave that stole the tarts, but there is no knave”). Based on this 
observation, Beaver and Geurts (2014) formulate the following generalization:  
Table 8. Predictions 
 Entailments Presuppositions Conversational implicatures 
Project from embeddings 0 1 0 
Cancellable when embedded  -- 1 -- 





Note. The horizontal lines indicate that Beaver and Geurts (2014) do not provide values for those 
cells. 
This generalization fits with the further observation that, mostly, the presuppositions of 
unembedded affirmative statements are entailments (Simons, 2006). Accordingly, the 
presuppositions of unembedded affirmative statements should not be cancellable without 
contradiction. These observations about cancellation pose a challenge to the view that 
presupposition gives rise to the differing stances towards the antecedents conveyed by 
indicative and subjunctive conditionals, inasmuch as only further embeddings of the 
conditionals should permit cancellation. Yet, the results from Experiment 2 show that the 
stances towards the antecedent were cancellable for both indicatives and subjunctives, and 
even more cancellable than a commitment to scalar implicatures. 
 The finding of this cancellation effect thus provides support for a conversational 
implicature account (Iatridou, 2000; Leahy, 2011, 2018) over a presupposition (Kutschera, 
1974; Stalnaker, 1975, 2014; von Fintel, 1997) or entailment account. This rejection of a 
presupposition account is further strengthened by our results in Experiment 1, where it was 
found that the belief-state assumptions concerning the antecedents of indicative and 
subjunctive conditionals do not project through embedding under various operators. 
  
The Source of the Conversational Implicatures 
 A challenge for a conversational implicature account is that it must be shown in 
principle11 how the conversational implicature to the falsity of antecedent of subjunctive 
conditionals could be reconstructed based on general maxims of communication (Grice, 
1989). In Leahy (2018), this conversational implicature is accounted for by applying the 
 
11  Note that the circumstance that rational reconstructions in terms of abductive 
reasoning like this can be carried out does not mean that they play a role for the underlying 
psychological processes, or that they could not have become conventionalized in time (for 






notion of scalar implicatures to the presuppositions of a sentence. Leahy further holds that the 
presuppositions of counterfactuals (Ø) is logically weaker than the presuppositions of 
indicative conditionals (i.e. that the antecedent is epistemically possible). These constraints 
generate the expectation that the choice of the subjunctive means that the speaker was not 
warranted in making the stronger presuppositions of the corresponding indicative conditional. 
One difficulty with this view is, however, that, our data suggest that it is not, in fact, a 
presupposition of indicative conditionals that the antecedent is epistemically possible. In 
addition, participants considered the belief-state assumption of the antecedent to be more 
cancellable than scalar implicatures for both indicatives and subjunctives in Experiment 2.  
 Another possibility runs as follows: in the choice of a conditional construction (“if A, 
then C”) over a conjunction (“A & C”), the speaker signals that they are not warranted in 
making the stronger assertion of committing to the truth of A. Rather, by making a conditional 
assertion, the speaker can express their view about a relationship between C and A while 
remaining uncommitted about A. By further choosing the subjunctive mood (e.g. ‘if [past 
tense], would …’), where past tense morphology is employed which does not have a literal 
past tense interpretation (Iatridou, 2000; Ippolito, 2003), further distance is expressed. If 
interpreted doxastically, there are only three possibilities for categorical beliefs: either the 
speaker believes A, the speaker is neutral about A, or the speaker disbelieves A. If the speaker 
had been in a position to believe A, a conjunction could have been used. Instead, the speaker 
chose a conditional construction. If the speaker wished to remain neutral about A, a 
conditional in the indicative mood could have been used. Instead, the speaker chose a more 
convoluted formulation employing fake past tense to express further distance. Given that the 
speaker does not believe A, and is not content with remaining neutral about A, their 






Anderson Conditionals, Modus Tollens, and Presuppositions 
 In Anderson conditionals, the speaker complicates the interpretational task of his/her 
interlocutors even further. The speaker does this by combining a conditional construction with 
past tense morphology that is not to be taken literally (“If Jones had taken arsenic, he would 
have shown exactly those symptoms…”) with a factive relative clause (“…which he does in 
fact show”), which cancels the doxastic distance introduced by the subjunctive mood. Here 
again the hearer is faced with the challenge of figuring out why a cooperative speaker would 
use such a convoluted way of expressing him-/herself. If participants invest sufficient 
resources, they could generate the hypothesis that the speaker is using this complex 
construction as part of an argument that purports to dispel doubt about the antecedent. In the 
absence of alternative explanations for the patients’ symptoms, this sub-argument could in 
turn be used as part of a larger argument to establish the truth of the antecedent, via an 
inference to the best explanation along the following lines: 
’I think the patient took arsenic; for he has such-and-such symptoms; and these are the 
symptoms he would have if he had taken arsenic’ (Edgington, 2008, p. 6) 
In Zakkou (2019), it is argued that, contrary to appearances, Anderson conditionals do not 
provide a counterexample against a presupposition account. As part of her argument, Zakkou 
points out that a speaker, who first asserts 7a) and then 7b) need not contradict herself: 
7a) “If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown the same symptoms he actually 
shows”, 7b) “So he took arsenic” 
The contradiction attributed to the presupposition account is removed, it is argued, if the 
speaker only accepts that Jones did not take arsenic for the purpose of the conversation in 
asserting 7a) and accepts that Jones did take arsenic, because she believes that he did, in 





ordinary speakers are just as sophisticated in keeping track of different attitudes. The simpler 
explanation is that the speaker is cancelling a conversational implicature. 
 Similarly, Zakkou (2019) suggests that the speaker in (16) accepts for the purpose of 
conversation that Jones did not take arsenic and asserts his own belief to the contrary via a 
relative clause:  
(16) If Jones had taken arsenic—which he did—he would have shown the 
same symptoms he actually shows. 
A more straightforward account would be that the speaker cancels a commitment to the 
conversational implicature that Jones did not take arsenic through the relative clause.  
In both cases, further empirical work is needed to distinguish between these 
possibilities. But it is worth highlighting that while it was found that participants have the 
same posterior probability of attributing belief and disbelief to the antecedent of an Anderson 
conditional in Experiment 1, negating an Anderson conditional shifts the modal tendency 
towards disbelief. So, it was not found that the belief state assumption concerning the 
antecedent of Anderson conditionals exhibit the standard behavior of presuppositions. 
 Zakkou (2019) also dismisses an argument against the presupposition account based 
on Stalnaker’s (1975, 2014) observation that the following modus tollens argument does not 
beg the question and presuppose what it is supposed to establish (i.e. the butler’s innocence): 
  (8) "If the butler had done it, we would have found blood on the knife. The kitchen 
 knife was clean; therefore the butler did not do it". 
To make the case, Zakkou considers related examples in which the speaker may use 
presuppositions in the technical sense and anticipate the conclusion of a modus tollens 
argument, without begging the question by introducing the conclusion as a tacit premise. The 
discussion overlooks, however, that on a presuppositional account, the first premise of the 





premise is false or a truth-value gap (von Fintel, 2004). So, to have an argument with true 
premises, it is a requirement of an account that makes the falsity of the antecedent a 
presupposition of a subjunctive conditional that the conclusion is already true with the first 
premise, which is indeed question-begging.  
In contrast, a conversational implicature account would fare better. For conversational 
implicatures are only plausible inferences about the speaker’s mental states that the 
interlocutor is defeasibly warranted in making. This allows for the factual premises of the 
argument to be true irrespectively of the status of these inferences. Through the entailment, 
the modus tollens argument ensures that the premises cannot be true without the conclusion 
being true. So, whereas an uncancelled conversational implicature of the first premise at most 
establishes that it is reasonable for the interlocutor to assume that the speaker believes that the 
butler is innocent, the conclusion of the modus tollens argument shows that the butler must be 
innocent. The conversational implicature account, in other words, separates the truth and 
factual content of the premises from the conversational assumptions about the speaker’s belief 
states and thereby avoids begging the question about the factual truth of the conclusion. 
 
Mental Models Theory  
 Finally, we turn to the implications of our findings for Mental Models Theory (MMT).  
On the current revised version of MMT (Khemlani et al., 2018), the meaning of conditionals 
is explicated by Table 9: 
Table 9. Mapping between indicative and counterfactuals, MMT 
Row Partition  Factual:    
If A then C            
Counterfactual: 
If A had happened then C would have 
happened 
1 A C  Possibility Counterfactual possibility 
2 A Not-C Impossibility Impossibility 
3 Not-A C Possibility Counterfactual possibility 
4 Not-A Not-C Possibility Fact 





Conditionals are here interpreted as conjunctive assertions about possibilities (i. e. 
“A&C is possible and A&¬C is not possible...”). That not-A is possible is a shared 
presupposition of true and false conditionals; what matters for their truth evaluation is just 
that the first two rows get switched. In the case of counterfactual conditionals, the “¬A&¬C” 
possibility acquires the status of being a fact and the other possibilities change status to 
express “counterfactual possibilities”, which were once possible but did not obtain. That the 
“¬A&¬C” possibility is a fact is rendered a presupposition when proponents of mental model 
speak of “the presupposed facts” (see, e.g., Byrne, 2005, 2016, 2017; Espino & Byrne, 2018). 
If MMT adheres to a classical definition of presupposition (as suggested in Ragni & 
Johnson-Laird, 2020), we take the theory to hold that the presuppositions project under 
various operators and are not cancellable as long as the conditionals are unembedded. On this 
understanding, the theory therefore stands in tension with our findings, which suggest that the 
stances towards the antecedent do not project and are cancellable.  
   
Conclusion 
 In this paper, we present new experimental evidence on the doxastic status of 
subjunctive conditionals. Previous theoretical papers in linguistics (e.g. Iatridou, 2000; 
Ippolito, 2003) have discussed the possibility of conversational implicature and 
presupposition accounts of the assumed falsity of subjunctive conditionals, but without 
presenting empirical data that could help decide the issue. To this end, we developed new 
stimulus materials to selectively manipulate the belief states of participants when evaluating 
indicative and subjunctive conditionals and probed the conversational implicature account and 
the presupposition account across two experiments. As part of these studies, we additionally 
investigated how participants assess so-called Anderson conditionals, where the falsity of the 





that operators like negation, possibility modals, and interrogatives have an effect on 
participants’ belief-state assumptions and that a presupposition hypothesis predicting that 
belief-state assumptions project past such operators could be rejected. Further, it was found in 
a cancellation task, that belief-state assumptions of indicative conditionals and subjunctive 
conditionals were either just as cancellable as scalar implicatures (subjunctive conditionals) or 
even more cancellable than scalar implicatures (indicative conditionals). This finding 
indicates that one of the central meaning differences between indicative and subjunctive 
conditionals can be attributed to a phenomenon which is uncontroversially pragmatic in 
nature; to wit, conversational implicatures.  
 
References 
Adams, E. (1970). Subjunctive and Indicative Conditionals. Foundations of Language, 6,   
89-94. 
Anderson, A. R. (1951). A note on subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals. Analysis, 12, 
35–38. 
Baayen, R. H., Davidson, D. J., and Bates, D. M. (2008). Mixed-effects modeling with 
crossed random effects for subjects and items. Journal of Memory and Language, 59, 
340-412. 
Baratgin, J., Over, D. E., & Politzer, G. (2013). Uncertainty and de Finetti tables. Thinking & 
Reasoning, 19, 308-328. 
Barrouillet, P., & Lecas, J.-F. (1998). How can mental models theory account for content 






Beaver, D. I., & Geurts, B. (2014). Presupposition. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Winter 2014 Edition). Retrieved from 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/presupposition/ 
Bennett, J. (2003). A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Birner, B. J. (2013). Introduction to Pragmatics. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons. 
Blome-Tillmann, M. (2013). Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them). 
Philosophy Compass, 8(2), 170–185. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12003 
Bradley, R. (2012). Multidimension Possible-world Semantics for Conditionals. The 
Philosophical Review, 121(4), 539-71. 
Bringsjord, S., & Govindarajulu, N. S. (2020). Rectifying the mischaracterization of logic by 
mental model theorists. Cognitive Science, 44.    
Bürkner, P. (2017). brms: An R Package for Bayesian Multilevel Models Using Stan. Journal 
of Statistical Software, 80(1), 1-28. 
Bürkner, P., & Vuorre, M. (2019). Ordinal Regression Models in Psychological Research: A 
Tutorial. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science. March 
2019:77-101. doi:10.1177/2515245918823199 
Byrne, R. M. J. (2005). The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to 
Reality. MIT Press. 
Byrne, R. M. J. (2016). Counterfactual Thought. Annual Review of Psychology, 67(1), 135–
157. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-122414-033249 
Byrne, R. M. J. (2017). Counterfactual Thinking: From Logic to Morality. Current Directions 
in Psychological Science, 26(4), 314–322. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417695617 
Byrne, R. M. J., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2019). If and or: Real and counterfactual 
possibilities in their truth and probability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 






Byrne, R. M. J., & Tasso, A. (1999). Deductive reasoning with factual, possible, and 
counterfactual conditionals. Memory & Cognition, 27(4), 726–740. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03211565 
Chemla, E,, & Bott, L. (2013). Processing presuppositions: Dynamic semantics vs pragmatic 
enrichment. Language and Cognitive Processes, 38, 241–260.  
Declerck, R., & Reed, S. (2001). Conditionals: A Comprehensive Empirical Analysis. Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter. 
de Vega, M., Urrutia, M., & Riffo, B. (2007). Canceling updating in the comprehension of 
counterfactuals embedded in narratives. Memory & Cognition, 35(6), 1410–1421. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03193611 
Edgington, D. (1995). On conditionals. Mind, 104, 235-329. 
Edgington, D. (2006). Conditionals. In: E.N. Zalta (Eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2008 edn.). Retrived from: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
win2008/entries/conditionals/. 
Edgington, D. (2008). I-Counterfactuals. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 108(1), 1–
21. 
Espino, O., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2018). Thinking About the Opposite of What Is Said: 
Counterfactual Conditionals and Symbolic or Alternate Simulations of Negation. 
Cognitive Science, 42(8), 2459–2501. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12677 
Evans, J. St. B. T. & Over, D. (2004). If. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ferguson, H. J., & Sanford, A. J. (2008). Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds: An 
eye-movement investigation. Journal of Memory and Language, 58(3), 609–626. 
Fillenbaum, S. (1974). Information amplified: Memory for counterfactual conditionals. 





Fugard, A. J. B., Pfeifer, N., Mayerhofer, B., and Kleiter, G. D. (2011). How People Interpret 
Conditionals: Shifts Toward the Conditional Event. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37(3), 635-648. 
Gazdar, G. (1979). Pragmatics: Implicature, Presuppositions, and Logical Form. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Geurts, B., Kissine, M., and van Tiel, B. (2020). Pragmatic reasoning in autism. In: Morsanyi, 
K. and Byrne, R. (Eds.), Thinking, reasoning and decision making in autism (pp. 113-
134). London: Routledge.  
Goodwin, G. P., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2018). The Truth of Conditional Assertions. 
Cognitive Science, 42, 2502-2533.  
Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Horn, L. R. (1984). Towards a New Taxonomy for Pragmatic Inference: Q-based and R-based 
Implicature. In: Schiffrin, D. (Eds), Georgetown University Round Table on 
Languages and Linguistics 1984 (pp. 11-42). Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press. 
Huang, Y. (2007). Pragmatics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Huddleston, R. (2002). Content clauses and reported speech. In R. Huddleston & G. K. 
Pullum (Eds.), The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language (pp. 947–1030). 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Iatridou, S. (2000). The Grammatical Ingredients of Counterfactuality. Linguistic Inquiry, 
31(2), 231–270. https://doi.org/10.1162/002438900554352 
Ippolito, M. (2003). Presuppositions and Implicatures in Counterfactuals. Natural Language 
Semantics, 11(2), 145–186. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024411924818 





Johnson-Laird, P.N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (1991). Deduction. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2002). Conditionals: a theory of meaning, 
pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review 109, 646-678. 
Kadmon, N. (2001). Formal Pragmatics. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
Khemlani, S. S., Byrne, R. M. J., & Johnson‐Laird, P. N. (2018). Facts and Possibilities: A 
Model-Based Theory of Sentential Reasoning. Cognitive Science, 42(6), 1887–1924. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12634 
Kutschera, F. (1974). Indicative Conditionals. Theoretical linguistics, 1, 257-269.  
Leahy, B. (2011). Presuppositions and Antipresuppositions in Conditionals. Semantics and 
Linguistic Theory, 21, 257. https://doi.org/10.3765/salt.v21i0.2613 
Leahy, B. (2018). Counterfactual antecedent falsity and the epistemic sensitivity of 
counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies, 175, 45-69. 
Lecas, J.-F., & Barrouillet, P. (1999). Understanding conditional rules in childhood and 
adolescence: A mental models approach. Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitive/Current 
Psychology of Cognition, 18(3), 363–396. 
Levinson, S. C. (1983). Pragmatics. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Levinson, S. C. (2000). Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalized conversational 
implicature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Lewis, D. (1976). Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities. Philosophical 
Review, 85, 297-315. 
Mittwoch, A., Huddleston, R., & Collins, P. (2002). The clause: Adjuncts. In R. Huddleston 
& G. K. Pullum (Eds.), The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language (pp. 663–





Oaksford, M. & Chater, N. (2007). Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to 
Human Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Over, D. E., Hadjichristidis, C., Evans, J. S. B. T., Handley, S. J., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). 
The probability of causal conditionals. Cognitive Psychology, 54(1), 62–97.  
Over, D. E., & Baratgin, J.  (2017). The “defective” truth table: Its past, present, and future. 
In N. Galbraith, E. Lucas, & D. E. Over (Eds.), The Thinking Mind: A Festschrift for 
Ken Manktelow (pp. 15-28). Abingdon, UK: Routledge. 
Pfeifer, N. & Tulkki, L. (2017). Conditionals, Counterfactuals, and Rational Reasoning: An 
Experimental Study of Basic Principles. Minds and Machines, 27(1), 119-165. 
Politzer, G., Over, D. E., & Baratgin, J. (2010). Betting on conditionals. Thinking and 
Reasoning, 16(3), 172–197. 
Potts, C. (2007). Into the Conventional-Implicature Dimension. Philosophy Compass, 2(4), 
665-679. 
Potts, C. (2015). Presupposition and implicature. In Shalom Lappin and Chris Fox (Eds.), The 
Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory (pp. 168-202), 2nd edn,. Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell.  
Quelhas, A. C., Rasga, C., & Johnson‐Laird, P. N. (2018). The Relation Between Factual and 
Counterfactual Conditionals. Cognitive Science, 42(7), 2205–2228. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12663 
Ragni, M., and Johnson-Laird, P. (2020). Reasoning about epistemic possibilities. Acta 
Psychologica, 208, 103081. 
R Core Team (2015). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation 
for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. URL http://www.R-project.org/. 
Reips, U. D. (2002). Standards for Internet-based experimenting. Experimental Psychology, 





Roberts, C. (1996). Information structure in discourse: Towards an integrated formal theory of 
pragmatics. Semantics & Pragmatics, 5(6), 1-69. 
Romoli, J., & Schwarz, F. (2015). An experimental comparison between presuppositions and 
indirect scalar implicatures. In: Schwarz (Ed.). Experimental perspectives on 
presuppositions. Studies in Theoretical Psycholinguistics (Vol. 45, pp. 215-240). 
Springer, Cham. 
Santamaría, C., Espino, O., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2005). Counterfactual and Semifactual 
Conditionals Prime Alternative Possibilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31(5), 1149–1154. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-
7393.31.5.1149 
Schroyens, W. (2010). A meta-analytic review of thinking about what is true, possible, and 
irrelevant in reasoning from or reasoning about conditional propositions. European 
Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 22 (6), 897-921. 
Simons, M. (2006). Foundational Issues in Presupposition. Philosophy Compass, 1(4), 357-
372. 
Skovgaard-Olsen, N., Collins, P., Krzyżanowska, K., Hahn, U., and Klauer, K. C. (2019). 
Cancellation, Negation, and Rejection. Cognitive Psychology, 108, 42-71. 
Smith, E. A. and Hall, K-C. 2011. Projection diversity: Experimental evidence. Workshop on 
Projective Meaning at ESLLI 2011. 
Soames, S. (1982). How presuppositions are inherited: a solution to the Projection Problem. 
Linguistic Inquiry, 13, 483-545. 
Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1995). Relevance: Communication and Cognition (Second 
Edition). Oxford, England: Blackwell. 
Stalnaker, R. C. (1968). A Theory of Conditionals. In: Rescher, N. (Eds.), Studies in Logical 





Stalnaker, R. (1972). Pragmatics. In D. Davidson & G. Harman (Eds.), Semantics of natural 
language (pp. 389–408). Reidel: Dordrecht. 
Stalnaker, R. (1974). Pragmatic presuppositions. In M. Munitz & P. Unger (Eds.), Semantics 
and philosophy (pp. 197–214). New York, NY: New York University Press. 
Stalnaker, R. C. (1975). Indicative conditionals. Philosophia, 5(3), 269-286.  
Stalnaker, R. (2014). Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Starr, W. B. (2014). A Uniform Theory of Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 
43(6), 1019-1064. 
Starr, W. (2019). Counterfactuals. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition). Retrieved from forthcoming URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/counterfactuals/>. 
Stewart, A. J., Haigh, M., & Kidd, E. (2009). An investigation into the online processing of 
counterfactual and indicative conditionals. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 62(11), 2113–2125. 
Thompson, V. A., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Reasoning counterfactually: Making inferences 
about things that didn’t happen. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory and Cognition, 1154–1170. 
von Fintel, K. (1997). The presupposition of subjunctive conditionals. In MIT working papers 
in linguistics 25 (pp. 29–44). Cambridge, MA: MIT Working Papers in Linguistics. 
von Fintel, K. (2004). Would you believe it? The king of France is back! Presuppositions and 
truth-value intuitions. In: Reimer, M. and Bezuidenhout, A. (eds.), Descriptions and 
Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 269–296. 
von Fintel, K. (2012). Subjunctive conditionals. In G. Russell & D. Graff Fara (Eds.), The 






Wagenmakers, E. J., Marsman, M., Jamil, T., Ly, A., Verhagen, J., et al. (2018). Bayesian 
inference for psychology. Part I: Theoretical advantages and practical ramifications. 
Psychon Bull Rev, 25, 35-57. 
Zakou, J. (2019). Presupposing Counterfactuality. Semantics & Pragmatics, 12(21), 1-20. 
https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.12.21. 
 
